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abstract
Allusions to Cicero in the late-medieval tractatus nauticus. The Middle Ages is 
presented as far removed from the development of the sciences, focusing instead on 
religious aspects. One of the disciplines that had been turning into a science through 
the Classical World and the Middle Ages was navigation. Numerous tractatus 
nautici, written towards the end of the Middle Ages, have survived. These attempt 
to describe systems and navigational techniques based not only on mathematics 
and astronomy, but also on philosophy. The philosophy of Cicero’s is a recurrent 
question in these works1.
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1. General aspects
It is traditional to consider the Middle Ages a long, decadent and dark ten-
century period.2 This is also due to the brilliance of the previous epoch, the 
Classical Age, and the latter’s rebirth in the Renaissance.3 Thus, the contrast 
between lux, referring to the classic, and tenebra is established for the first part of 
the Medieval age, which expresses the fall of that splendorous Antiquity and the 
birth and development, paradoxically, of a new period in which all the forgotten 
knowledge that had no place in Christianity, the religion that enveloped all 
aspects of medieval life, would reappear.4 Thus, the Renaissance represented 
a New Age, with this retrospection and awareness of the Classical World that 
would illuminate the medieval darkness.5
Furthermore, the Middle Ages are presented as an innovative period in all the 
fields and disciplines that made up the science navigation. In some cases, it meant 
new development and, in others, assimilating influences from other places.6 The 
2. The name Middle Ages has negative connotations. Without going into the complex aspects of whether 
the Middle Ages should be considered pure fiction, because this was the humanist vision of it, it was 
they who gave it this name as an earlier, dark stage between the exalted Greek-Latin World and its 
recovery in the later Classicism. The Italian humanists in the final decades of the 15th century coined 
the term “Middle Ages”, with expressions like Media Aetas or Medium Aevum. The first to use the term, 
referring to the period between 410 A.D. (the sack of Rome by Alaric) and his own time, was the bishop 
of Aleria, Giovanni Andrea dei Bussi, who, in a letter dated 1469, wrote sed mediae tempestatis tum veteris, 
tum recentiores usque ad nostra tempora. However, we owe the denomination “Middle Ages”, understood as 
a historical stage with a certain unity, a priori to the Florentine humanist Favio Biondo de Forli (1392-
1463), who coined the term in his 1438 work, Década de la historia desde la decadencia del Imperio Romano, 
to refer to these ten centuries of cultural-social stagnation, and that Dei Bussi picked up again years later. 
3. Corral, José L. “Historia y Ficción sobre la Edad Media”. Aragón en la Edad Media, 18 (2004): 27; 
Fernández, Gonzalo. “Las grandes periodizaciones de la Historia Universal”. Boletín Millares Carlo, 26 
(2007): 119-120; Torres, Claudia. Astronomía en el Medievo. Espiritualidad versus materialismo. Manizales: 
Universidad de Manizales, 2008: 3-4; Valdeón, Julio. “La valoración histórica de la Edad Media: entre el 
mito y la realidad”, Memoria, mito y realidad en la historia medieval. XIII semana de Estudios Medievales, José 
Ángel García, José Ángel de la Iglesia, Francisco Javier García, José Luis Martín, eds. Logroño: Gobierno 
de la Rioja-Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2002: 311-313. 
4. Koyré, Alexandre. Del mundo cerrado al universo infinito. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1996: 5; Lamboa, 
Joaquín. “El pensamiento como lugar de convivencia en el pasado”. Thémata, 37 (2006): 302; Valdeón, 
Julio. “La desmitificación de la Edad Media”, Miradas a la Historia: reflexiones historiográficas en recuerdo, 
María Encarna Nicolás, José A. Gómez, Juan José Carreras, Miguel Rodríguez, eds. Murcia: Universidad 
de Murcia, 2004: 29. 
5. For further knowledge about the Middle Ages, see: Heers, Jacques. La invención de la Edad Media. 
Barcelona: Crítica, 1995. For more information about medieval navigation, see: Medina-Hernández, 
Carlos. “La navegación en Alfonso de Palencia”, Estudios de latín medieval hispánico, José Martínez, Cándida 
Ferrero, Óscar de la Cruz, eds. Firenze: Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2011: 569-578; Medina-Hernández, Carlos. 
“Textos científico-técnicos latinos: desarrollo y evolución de la navegación desde la Antigua Roma hasta la 
Edad Media”, Actas de las Primeras Jornadas de Jóvenes Investigadores Predoctorales en Ciencias de la Antigüedad y 
de la Edad Media: Cuestiones metodológicas y estado de la investigación, Ainoa Castro, ed. Barcelona: Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona, 2011.
6. Alonso, Fernando. “Las embarcaciones y navegaciones en el mundo celta, de la Edad Antigua y la 
Edad Media”, Guerra exploraciones y navegación: Del mundo antiguo a la edad moderna, Víctor Alonso, ed. 
Ferrol: Universidad de A Coruña, 1997: 92-93; Chic, Genaro; de Frutos, Gregorio. “La península ibérica 
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techniques of astronomic orientation were based on mathematics and arithmetic, 
but also on philosophy and logic and on the different nautical instruments from 
the Orient. Framed in mathematical-philosophical laws, they were grounded in the 
visual knowledge of the heavenly bodies, in that uis diuina that the ancient peoples 
refered to to explain their movements, and a rigorous and scientific study of these 
forces and inertias, which had been evolving, developing and consolidating from 
ancient times.7
Roman navigation inherited the methods of going to sea from the Greeks 
and other earlier civilisations, like the Phoenicians. The texts show that these 
techniques were based on two primitive and rudimentary types: following the 
coasts, always keeping them within visual contact, and freeing birds to follow 
routes where it was not possible to keep land in sight.8 This, combined with the 
limited preparation and specialisation of the ships, meant the sailors had no 
guarantee of a safe return after leaving the Mare Nostrum behind and crossing the 
Pillars of Hercules, although there is textual evidence that Roman, and earlier 
sailors, went beyond this area, despite the legends that the known world ended 
in the Strait of Gibraltar.9 
en el marco de las colonizaciones mediterráneas”. Habis, 15 (1984): 225; González, José A.; Medina-
Hernández, Carlos. “Técnicas astronómicas de orientación e instrumentos náuticos en la navegación 
medieval”. Fortunatae, 29 (2009): 17; Gozalbes, Enrique. “La navegación en Tarifa en época romana”. 
Revista de Estudios Tarifeños, 39 (2000): 34-36; Naveiro, Juan L. “El comercio en el N.W. peninsular”. 
Memorias de Historia Antigua, 13-14 (1991): 27 and 63-66; Vernet, Juan. Estudios sobre Historia de la Ciencia 
Medieval. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1979: 234-235. On the other hand, it should not be 
overlooked that Rome wanted to keep all Europe and the known world under control, by both land and 
sea.
7. Guerrero, Víctor M. “La navegación en el mundo antiguo. Mercantes, fenicios y cartagineses”. 
Aldaba, 30 (1998): 181-182; Millàs, José M. Assaig d’història de les idees físiques i matemàtiques a la 
Catalunya medieval. Barcelona: Edicions Científiques Catalanes, 1983: 43-45; Wallis, Faith. “Science: 
Introduction”, Medieval Latin. An introduction and bibliographical guide, Frank Anthony Carl Mantello, 
Arthur George Rigg, eds. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1996: 342-345. Cicero 
se referred to this uis diuina that the gods left for the working of the cosmos, as we shall see below. 
See, for this regard the following text from the Ciceronian De natura Deorum: Sed non omnia, Balbe, 
quae cursus certos et constantis habent, ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. Quid Chalcidico Euripo 
in motu identidem reciprocando putas fieri posse constantius, quid freto Siciliensi, quid Oceani feruore illis in 
locis, “Europam Libyamque rapax ubi diuidit unda”? Quid aestus maritimi uel Hispanienses uel Brittannici 
eorumque certis temporibus uel accessus uel recessus sine deo fieri nonne possunt? Uide, quaeso, si omnis motus 
omniaque, quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conseruant, diuina dicimus, ne tertianas quoque febres et 
quartanas diuinas esse dicendum sit; quarum reuersione et motu quid potest esse constantius? Sed omnium 
talium rerum ratio reddenda est. (Cicero. Natura Deorum, 3, 24). 
8. Antelo, Antonio. “El Atlántico en la historia y la leyenda”. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, 3 (1993): 573-575; 
González, José A.; Medina-Hernández, Carlos. “Técnicas astronómicas de orientación...”: 17-19; Millàs, 
José M. Assaig d’història de les idees físiques...: 25-45. 
9. Izquierdo, Pere. “Los condicionantes de la navegación en la antigüedad: una aproximación al caso 
de la Provincia Hispania Citerior mediterránea”, I Simposio de Historia de las técnicas. La construcción naval 
y la navegación, Juan J. Achútegui, ed. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1996: 300-301; Santana, 
Antonio; Arcos, Trinidad. “El conocimiento geográfico del Océano en la Antigüedad”. Eres: Arqueología/
Bioantropología, 10 (2002): 19-25. A Mycenean wreck has recently been found at the mouth of the Tagus. 
This shows that since the Myceneans, at the end of the Bronze Age, there has been a desire to travel the 
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However, amongst the ancient peoples, the Ocean was seen as an undefined, 
infinite and even unreal place. In contrast, the Mediterranean was common and 
understandable.10 Compared with the vastness of the Ocean, the Mediterranean is 
a landlocked basin, limited in size, and with a favourable climate for navigation in 
the corresponding period, ideal for voyages and also offering sailors more or less 
optimum conditions to sail to their destination and return to port the same way.11 
In the Medieval period, the techniques used for astronomical orientation were 
of great complexity, attested by the fact that in this period the theoretical aspects 
of navigation began to be gathered in tractatus with detailed descriptions, which 
were of great importance for the development of civilisation.12 These centuries 
allowed astronomy to develop, and become a central point of the nautical world, 
constituting and building these techniques on a mathematical-philosophical base 
that also englobed other disciplines, like cartography or hydrography.13 The linking 
of these astronomic techniques to earlier knowledge that lacked an astronomical 
basis, generated a compendium of information and data that the medieval wise men 
knew how to interpret to compose their treatises in Latin, and gave shape to the 
scientific character that navigation was acquiring. 
2. Allusions to Cicero from Medieval Navigation 
Although many tractatus were written about nautical knowledge in the Middle 
Ages, the one that features in this study is the De nauigatione libri tres quibus 
seas and sail out into the Ocean. See: Domínguez, Adolfo J. “Hércules en España”. Historia, 16 (1992): 
56-88.
10. Aznar, Eduardo. “Del mar soñado al mar hollado: redescubrimiento del Océano”. Cuadernos del 
CEMyR, 15 (2007): 175-176; Molina, Ángel L. “Los viajes por mar en la Edad Media”. Cuadernos de 
Turismo, 5 (2000): 114; Chic, Genaro. “Roma y el Mar”, Guerra, exploraciones y navegación: del mundo 
antiguo a la edad moderna, Víctor Alonso, ed. Ferrol: Universidad de A Coruña, 1995: 55.
11. Molina, Ángel L. “Los viajes por mar...”: 114-116; Izquierdo, Pere. “Los condicionantes de la 
navegación en la antigüedad...”: 300-301 and 304-306. These elements, that favour navigation during 
spring and summer led the ancient peoples to divide the year into two, in function of the weather, when 
talking about sailing: mare apertum and mare clausum, as Vegetius shows us. Greek authors, like Hesiod, 
had already shown the existence of a nautical season corresponding to the forty days before the fall of 
the Pleiades and other seasonal events.
12. In addition to the treaty offered in this study, there are many others used for navigation in relation 
to astronomy, cosmography, geodesy, etc. like De Arte atque ratione navigandi libri duo, in quorum priore 
tractantur pulcherrima problemata, in altero traduntur ex mathematicis disciplinis regulae et instrumenta artis 
nauigandi, quibus uaria rerum astronomicam phoenomena circa coelestium corporum motus explorare possumus 
(1546), In Problema Mechanicum Aristotelis de motu Nauigii ex Remis, In Theoricas Planetarum Georgii Purbachii 
Annotationes, De erratis Orontii Finaei liber unus (1546) by the Portuguese Pedro Núñez (1502-1578), or 
Commentarium in Astrolabium, quod Planisferium uocant (1551), Arithmetica, Cosmographia seu de Sphera 
Mundi, Geometria Practica, De incertitudine iudiciorum Astrologiae by Juan de Roxas. 
13. The treatises on navigation deal broadly with astronomy, mathematics, hydrography, philosophy 
and other relevant disciplines. Herein lies the multidisciplinary nature of navigation.
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Mathematicae disciplinae explicantur, one of the earliest to appear.14 It was composed 
at the end of the Middle Ages by the Portuguese erudite Jacobo de Saá, and printed 
and published in Paris in 1549.15 Bearing in mind the inexistence until then of 
a work that recompiled all the nautical knowledge of the Classical World and 
the new medieval contributions, including astronomy and other sciences related 
to navigation, the author, in his approach to such a vast amount of knowledge, 
composed his work dialogically. Its two principal elements were the main bases 
for navigation in those times: mathematics, representing the ratio, and ars, the 
philosophy.16 
Our study is based around five examples that allude to philosophy and 
Ciceronian thought. Although there are abundant references to authors from 
the classical and post-classical era, we concentrate on the allusions to Cicero as 
14. The cover of the book states: De nauigatione libri tres quibus Mathematicae disciplinae explicantur: ab Iacobo 
a Saa equite lusitano nuper in lucem editi. Parisiis. Ex officina Reginaldi Calderij et Claudij eius filij. 1549. Cum 
priuilegio Regis.
15. The life of the Portuguese Jacobo de Saá (Iacobus a Saa in Latin and Diogo de Sá in the Portuguese 
documentation) remains obscure. He is known to have been a humanist and member of the militia and 
decorated for his many years of service in Asia. He acquired a vast erudition, far above that of a soldier, 
and wrote a treatise about the practice of naval sciences, techniques of orientation and other associated 
aspects. His only known work is the De nauigatione libri tres quibus Mathematicae disciplinae explicantur 
(Paris, 1549), that was presented as a direct, sarcastic and on occasions, violent attack on the thesis of 
Pedro Núñez (Petrus Nonus Latinised and Pedro Nunes in Portuguese) in his works about the treatment of 
mathematics referring to navigation and, by extension, reality. (In this regard, there was a debate in the 
15th-century Portuguese world and later on the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum and especially, on 
the importance of practical knowledge. Controversy arose between ars-praxis and ratio-teorica). The De 
nauigatione is divided into three books structured as a dialogical debate (Philosophia is represented by Saa’s 
ideas, and Mathematica by Núñez) about the certainty of mathematics and its efficiency at providing true 
and accurate knowledge. Also, De Saá held that true and accurate knowledge, as Aristotle maintained, was 
obtained through study and the application of philosophy to any aspect of navigation that one wanted to 
work on. The De nauigatione was presented as an interesting treatise where both the proposals he made, 
and his attacks on Núñez, are vital for understanding medieval nautical science. His use of mathematics 
as a principle of absolute certainty over the knowledge of nature, reality, and the mathematisation of all 
these scientific displines would be the principal attacks that De Saá made on him. The Liber primus of 
the De nauigatione is about the application of mathematics to navigation and its certainty. In the secundus, 
allusions are made to the hierarchy of the sciences and the mathematical principles of nautical science 
with respect to its application in those. The Liber tertius ends the work with illustrated proposals of 
how to sail and what techniques to use. It also makes petitions, defends practical knowledge over the 
abstract and theoretical, and urges its readers to pay no heed to Núñez’s erroneous discourse. The De 
nauigatione libri tres is, in truth, all one exercise to show mathematical science’s incapacity to supply 
accurate knowledge about the physical reality, and to this extent, its subordination to philosophy, which 
does show the reality with certainty, with Pedro Núñez’s own lack of nautical practice being one of the 
most significant aspects of his attacks. On the other hand, although Jacobo de Saá was not the only one 
to criticise Pedro Núñez, the latter never replied, or at least we have to date no knowledge of any such 
conterattack. 
16. de Albuquerque, Luis. “Pedro Nunes e Diogo de Sá”, As Navegaçôes e sua projecçâo na Ciência e na 
Cultura. Lisbon: Gradiva Publicaçôes, 1987: 57-59; Leitào, Henrique. “Ars e Ratio: A náutica e a constituçâo 
da Ciência Moderna”, La ciencia y el mar, María I. Vicente, Mariano Esteban, eds. Valladolid: Universidad 
de Valladolid, 2006: 188-189 and 198-201; Randles, William G. L. “Pedro Nunes and the discovery of 
the loxodromic curve or how, in the Early Sixteenth Century, navigating with a globe had failed to solve 
the difficulties encountered with the plane chart”. Revista da Universidade da Coimbra (1990): 126-127. 
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one of the quintessential classics of Latin literature. It is also of great interest 
for the scholar of naigation to examine how the classical philosophical-logical 
aspects influenced a theme that is as heterodox and multidisciplinary as nautical 
science. This shows the importance that Jacobo de Saá, and all the mediaval 
writers of treatises on this theme in general, placed on philosophy as a key aspect 
for understanding nautical questions, otherwise so practical and immediate in 
actu. 
The first passage, that begins to examine the praefatio of the De nauigatione, already 
contains allusions to the very famous Marcus Tulius Cicero (but also Vitruvius to 
indicate the idea Saa took, but at the same level) when De Saá developed and 
organised his ideas,
Prisci illi auctores, inuictissime Rex, prius quam ulla scientia aut ars esset inuenta, nullum 
alium praeterquam seipsos in iis quae scripsere citarunt:17 quandoquidem a quo quicquam 
acciperent, erat nemo. Non tamen ideo id quod oculis ipsi uidebant, aut experimento 
admirantes reperiebant, scribere desierunt. Et sic philosophari coeperunt, ut Aristoteles 
innuit: Propter admirari coeperunt philosophari. His et aliis uisis atque expertis, tota illa 
tempestas scripturis prudentum exuberauit. Quorum lucubrationibus neoterici fruentes, ad 
ea quae non potuere, iuuantur. Et ita factum est, ut illorum quisque, tam ueterum quam 
neotericorum, quicquid intellectu attingere potuerint, in rationem ac ordinem redigerent. 
Hoc pacto ut lippis tonsoribusque patet, tam scientiae quam aliae res omnes, in ordinem 
atque rationem redactae sunt.18 Antiquitus enim, ut Cicero et Vitruuius asserunt, sine ordine 
procedebant.19
The ordo, thus, has to be set in any work, study or description to enable 
the knowledge to be distributed correctly and coherently. De Saá gives us a 
description of the origins of the sciences and arts. He also emphasises that science 
was born, in line with the Aristotilean words, at the moment when the ancient 
17. This appeal, inuictissime Rex, as aimed at King John III of Portugal (1502-1557), as expressed in the 
preface, f. 2r: Ad Ioannem Dei gratia inuictissimum Regem Lusitaniae, Algabiorum, ultra citraque mare, in Africa 
dominumque Guineae ac Indiae, eius nominis tertium, Iacobii a Saa, praefatio in libros de nauigatione.
18. In the clearly sarcastic way that Jacobo de Saá wants to express this it is clear how he wants to 
talk about the methods of the ancient philosophers, then applying this same idea sarcastically to 
the opera integra of Pedro Núñez, the person who De Saá attacks intellectually for basing all these 
phenomena generically on an almost absolute mathematical conception (Ars / Ratio). In this respect 
see note 15. 
19. “Those early scholars, very incorruptible King, before there was any science or art, began to refer 
to no other issues than themselves in these matters, which were recorded in writing as there were no 
others from which to take any ideas. However, by no means did they cease to compose their works 
through what they themselves could check or review, marvelling at his action. This they proceeded to 
do philosophy, as Aristotle agreed, “because of wondering, they started doing philosophy”. For these and 
other matters considered and experienced, all that mob of prudent people ended up with a plethora of 
works. The Neoterics who make use of those musings, sought help in such ideas, which did not progress. 
Also, it meant that each of those, either the old or the Neoterics, has been able to achieve something 
with the intellect, enabling them to evoke reason and order. In this situation, as it is accessible to those 
who are deprived of sight and those who cut human hair, they reverted to the order and reason of both 
the sciences and all other disciplines. In the antiquity, as Cicero and Vitruvius declared, they proceeded 
without order” (Iacobus a Saa. De nauigatione, 1, f. 2r-3ª). 
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wise men reflected about the facts of the world and “were surprised” by these. 
The same circumstance provoked a desire for continuation and experimentation 
to go on studying natural events. He divided these wise men into two types, the 
old and new, the latter being the heirs to the knowledge of the former. On one 
hand, it is obvious that with this emphatic sintagm prisci illi auctores, De Saá was 
referring to the Presocratic philosophers and the Neoteric or new philosophers, 
or poets, like the ones our author deals with, and who he mentions as he 
developes his ideas in a number of later passages in his text.20 In this respect, our 
author quotes Cicero to corroborate his idea that the ancients did not follow a 
particular pattern. However, the next passage from Cicero deals with order, but 
not alluding exactly to either the Presocratics or the new philosophers, 
Sed si quem magis delectant soluta, sequatur ea sane, modo sic ut, si quis Phidiae clipeum 
dissoluerit, conlocationis uniuersam speciem sustulerit, non singulorum operum uenustatem; 
ut in Thucydide orbem modo orationis desidero, ornamenta comparent. Isti autem cum 
dissoluunt orationem, in qua nec res nec uerbum ullum est nisi abiectum, non clipeum, sed, 
ut in prouerbio est—etsi humilius dictum est tamen simile est—, scopas (ut ita dicam) mihi 
uidentur dissoluere. Atque ut plane genus hoc, quod ego laudo, contempsisse uideantur, 
aut scribant aliquid uel Isocrateo more uel quo Aeschines aut Demosthenes utitur, tum illos 
existimabo non desperatione reformidauisse genus hoc, sed iudicio refugisse; aut reperiam 
ipse eadem condicione qui uti uelit, ut aut dicat aut scribat utra uoles lingua eo genere 
quo illi uolunt; facilius est enim apta dissoluere quam dissipata conectere. Res se autem sic 
habet, ut breuissime dicam quod sentio: composite et apte sine sententiis dicere insania est, 
sententiose autem sine uerborum et ordine et modo infantia, sed eius modi tamen infantia, 
ut ea qui utantur non stulti homines haberi possint, etiam plerumque prudentes; quo qui est 
contentus utatur. Eloquens uero, qui non approbationes solum sed admirationes, clamores, 
plausus, si liceat, mouere debet, omnibus oportet ita rebus excellat, ut ei turpe sit quicquam 
aut exspectari aut audiri libentius.21
20. Bear in mind that the term poet was used in ancient times to designate not only lyrical literary 
poets, but especially the philosophers, who also wrote their philosophy in verse. 
21. “But if someone likes more expressions without measure, cultivate them in good time, only that, 
as if someone decompose the shield of Phidias, they will make the overall beauty of the composition 
disappear but not the grace of each of its parts; so Thucydides and I only miss the roundness of the 
sentence, because the ornaments are revealed. More these modern ones, when they cut up their 
discourse. In it there is no content nor word that is not insignificant, not a shield, but rather, as the 
proverb states, which expressed somewhat lowly is a good simile, I think they break a broom so to 
speak. And so that it certainly seems they have neglected this style that I praise or something in the 
manner of Isocrates, for which they for using Aeschines or Demosthenes, and then I will believe 
that they have not been afraid of this style out of desperation to reach it, but they have avoided it on 
principle; or I myself will find whoever wishes to accept the same condition that he speak or writes 
in which you want the two languages  in the style they want, as it is easier to break down what you 
are making than to compose what is scattered. The reality, to say very briefly what I think is this: 
talk with ornament and rhythm without ideas is foolishness and talk with ideas without order or 
measure in the words, puerility, and puerility of such a nature, to those who make use of it may 
take themselves as men not foolish, even in the good sense, most times, of this use is content of 
who is content with it. But the eloquent speaker who merits applause, if it is possible, must excel 
in everything, so for him it is shameful to see or hear something with more pleasure” (Cicero. De 
oratore, 71, 234).
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This first approach, shows how Jacobo de Saá used Cicero’s ideas to 
demonstrate his own conception of things. While not an making any exact 
reference to philosophical-nautical knowledge, he chooses to use the rhetoric 
that he has used other times; mention Cicero’s references to other authors 
to defend his own positions. On the other hand, the following passage from 
Cicero’s Disputationes Tusculanae is a defence of Latin as the language of sciene 
and philosophy,
Cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem 
aliquando liberatus, rettuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, 
remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad 
rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia 
dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis litteris inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia 
Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper iudicium fuit omnia 
nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae 
quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent.22
Latin’s power to express abstract aspects is well-demonstrated. Apart from this, 
another aspect that draws our attention is how he procedes to apologise for Latin 
philosophy and thought, although many of the ideas and aspects of thought, as is 
known, were taken by the Romans from Greece. Furthermore, that does not mean 
that Rome did not have its own initiative and essence in all these questions, which 
is the idea that Cicero wished to emphasise and Jacobo de Saá supports to highlight 
the order that Roman thinkers brought to any field, compared with those primitive 
Presocratics and Neoterics.
The next passage from the De nauigatione develops dialogically. This way of 
fragmenting the ideas through a series of interventions between people, in 
this case between two disciplines, mathematics and philosophy set for all the 
work, is aimed at highlighting even more the delimitations of each of them as 
a discipline. As we have argued, both disciplines are key aspects of navigation 
in its most abstract and, at the same time, didactic field. By applying them, the 
erudite attempts to explain the quaestiones naturales of a scientific nature, in their 
meaning of exactitude, in contrast with their chance nature which is hence more 
typical of nature and that the philosophical science attempts to explain through 
observation, reflection and development of the ideas both disciplines taking 
nature as an inalterable base, 
22. “Having finally freed myself, although not completely, at least to a large extent, from the fatigues of 
legal parctice and my duties as a senator, I have returned, Brutus, attending to your insistent exhortations, 
to these studies that, postponed by circumstances but always present in my mind, I returned to resume 
now, after having been interrupted for a long period of time, and, since the system and the teaching of 
all disciplines relating to the righteous path of life are part of the study of wisdom called philosophy, 
I thought I should shed light on this question in Latin, not because I think that philosophy cannot be 
learned in Greek league and with Greek teachers, but because I have always been convinced that our 
fellow citizens, have either shown themselves wiser through their original creations or have improved 
what they have inherited from the Greeks, naturally I mean those fields they have been considered 
worthy of devoting their efforts to” (Cicero. Tusculanae, 1, 1).
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Mathematica: Ad hoc omnes illae mitigationes pertinent, quibus excludimus suspitionem 
uel arrogantiae, uel odii, uel saeuitiae, uel cuiuscumque rei quae offensura uidebatur. 
Et ut ingenue dicam quod sentio, non ausim dicere inconsulta haec Astronomia, ni ego 
essem, intelligi uix possit. Inficiari etenim non poteris, quod cum de quaestionibus loqueris 
naturalibus, me ipsam adducas testem. Et etiam Seneca uir doctissimus dixit, cum uentum est 
ad naturales quaestiones, Geometriae testimonio statur. Itaque quod in talibus questionibus 
dicis aut dicere uis me ipsam in testem uocas. Cumque hoc ita manifestum sit, non possum 
non tibi esse particeps, quoniam sine me quod uis explicare non potes, et tibi ualde necessaria 
sum. Philosophia: Festinare te nolo, ne nauseae molestiam, ut ait Cicero, suscipias aegra. Sed 
ad illud Senecae, quem citasti, tibi possem respondere, multa quidem adiuuant nos, neque 
partes nostri ideo sunt, nam cibus adiutorum corporis est, neque tamen pars est.23
Referring, then, to the passage from Cicero,
Modo fac, id quod est humanitatis tuae, ne quid aliud cures hoc tempore, nisi ut quam 
commodissime conualescas. Non ignoro, quantum ex desiderio labores; sed erunt omnia 
facilia, si ualebis: festinare te nolo, ne nauseae molestiam suscipias aeger et periculose hieme 
nauiges.24
In this second comparison, Jacobo de Saá refers to Cicero almost literally by 
copying a short quote from the Epistulae ad Familiares: Festinare te nolo, ne nauseae 
molestiam suscipias aeger. If we compare it with the version proposed in the De 
nauigatione, Festinare te nolo, ne nauseae molestiam, ut ait Cicero, suscipias aegra, expuesta, 
on starting his turn in the dialogue of the philosophy in response to that of the 
mathematics, we deduce that our treatise writer adapts the Ciceronian idea, with 
the corresponding morphological-syntactic modifications, in developing his textual 
scheme. As with the text mentioned above, there is an ambiguous allusion. While 
Cicero explains an annoying circumstance of the ship keeling over when navigating 
during winter, De Saá uses this quote adapted to contradict the explanation that the 
mathematical discipline offers philosophy. This example of the disruption or non-
23. “- Mathematics: all those mitigations for which we reject the distrust of arrogance, hatred, malice 
or any other matter, to be able to deal with it, is examined, are extended to this point. Even I do not 
say in any way what I consider or what I have not dared to say, as thoughtless, what astronomy is, 
and I were not in this position, it can plausibly become known. Certainly you will not have been able 
to deny that, dealing with natural issues, you use me, myself as a witness. Also, a man so learned as 
Seneca said: “Since it came to natural questions one depends on the proof of the geometry.” I mean, 
you summon me myself, witness against, given what you say, or want to say on such matters. So, it 
not having said it so, I cannot be in favour of you because without me you can not explain what you 
want, because I’m very necessary for you. -Philosophy: I do not want to constrict you so, as Cicero 
says, you not see the painful discomfort of nausea. More to what Seneca said, to which you have 
referred, I will be able to answer you: “Certainly many things help us, but are not thus part of us.” So 
food is of the body of the supporters? food, and so there is no party” (Iacobus a Saa. De nauigatione, 
2, f. 23).
24. “Now seek according to your good nature, do not worry right now for nothing more than 
recovering strength in the best possible circumstances. I am aware how much you suffer for nostalgia, 
but everything will be easier when you are well. I do not want to be hasty to expose yourself unwell to 
the dangers of seasickness and the risk of sailing in winter” (Cicero. Ad familiares, 16, 11).
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acceptance of the other party’s ideas, with a common denominator, navigation, is of 
great interest, on one hand, when checking the limits of each of these disciplines, 
and, on the other, to see how they could converge at some points some time during 
his work.
As we can see, the following passage from Jacobo de Saá is a defence of God 
as the supreme being in all cases, and is especially used to give validity to all the 
disciplines, in this case, referring to philosophy. The presentation of the ideas 
referring to Cicero in the text is structured around two different allusions, that 
we attempt to break down successively, first presented integrally the text proposed 
from the De nauigatione,
Quis enim tam indoctus est ut nesciat, quis tam imprudens ut non sentiat, aliquid inesse 
in Philosophia diuini? Quandoquidem, si Ciceroni credimus, Philosophia omnium mater 
artium est, et inuentum deorum. Haec nos primum ad illorum cultum, deinde ad ius 
hominum quod situm est in generis humani societate: tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque 
animi erudiuit: eademque ab animo tanquam ab oculis caliginem dispulit, ut omnia 
supera, infera, prima, ultima, media, uideremus. Prorsus haec mihi diuina uidetur uis, 
quae tot res efficiat et tantas. Quid enim est memoria rerum et uerborum? Quid porro 
inuentio? Profecto id, inquit Cicero, quo nec in Deo quicquam maius intellegi potest. 
Duo haec maxima Cicero in me affirmat esse, iudicium scilicet ueri, et finem bonorum. 
Qua in re Seneca declarat, sapientem causas naturalium et quaerere et nosse, ac horum 
numeros mensurasque Geometras persequi et supputare. Hinc est quod sapienti attribuit 
huius cognitionem, qua scilicet ratione constent caelestia, quae illis sit uis, quae natura. 
Cursus uero et recursus et obseruationes per quas descendunt, et eleuatur, cum peculiares 
ac tractatu faciles nobis non sint, quod simul cum illis minime descendamus et eleuemur, 
colligit mathematicus. Non te fugisse puto quod Cicero inquit: quod si uelis sapere, des 
operam Philosophiae tibi conuenit. Hinc te monet Seneca, Deorum immortalium munus 
esse, quod uiuimus: meum uero, quod bene uiuimus. Ac diuus Augustinus asserit, homini 
nullam esse causam philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit. Laertius etiam me solam esse et 
certam et ueram possessionem affirmat. Ac non longo ab his, Cicero rerum diuinarum et 
humanarum scientiam cognitionemque qua causa cuiusque rei sit, me dixit. Non latuit 
ob id praesentem cum dixit, Sapientia ubi inuenitur? Et quis est locus intelligentiae? 
Nescit homo precium eius, nec inuenitur in terra suauiter uiuentium.25
25. “For who is so ignorant that you can not get to know something? Who so insensitive as not to feel 
that there is something divine in the Philosophy? Certainly, if we are faithful to Cicero, Philosophy is the 
mother of all arts and invention of the gods. It is with us first for the worship of those, then for the law of 
men, which is in the coexistence of mankind. It then taught us modesty and magnanimity. It drove this 
same darkness from the spirit and the eyes, so that we can examine everything: the highest, the deepest, 
the first, the last, the central. This is shown fully to me as a divine force that reveals all important things 
and many others. Indeed, what is the memory of facts and word, and what is even invective? “Certainly 
this is so, (Cicero maintained), so not even God can conceive something that will surpass it” that is, the 
judgment of truth and the purpose of the good. In this case, Seneca declares that “wisdom seeks the 
causes of natural things and that the numbers and measures and these require and recalculate those 
of the geometers”. Here is what assigns the knowledge of this to the wise through a reason with which 
it is evident what the celestial phenomena consist of, that those are the same force, which is nature. 
More the mathematician takes the course and the resource, but also the comments, through which they 
descend and ascend as they are not peculiar and easily treated for us. Since at the same time, together 
with them, so little felt, we descend and ascend. I think you have not moved (in your explanations), as 
Cicero argues: “If you know, you should study philosophy”. At this point, Seneca warns you that there 
is a gift of the immortal gods, and that is living. And the Divine Augustus states that, if this is not being 
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In a first approach to the first allusion, comparing it with the following text by 
Cicero, the extensive copying from the work by the Roman orator is evident, 
Mihi uero ne haec quidem notiora et inlustriora carere ui diuina uidentur, ut ego aut 
poetam graue plenumque carmen sine caelesti aliquo mentis instinctu putem fundere, aut 
eloquentiam sine maiore quadam ui fluere abundantem sonantibus uerbis uberibusque 
sententiis. philosophia uero, omnium mater artium, quid est aliud nisi, ut Plato, donum, 
ut ego, inuentum deorum? Haec nos primum ad illorum cultum, deinde ad ius hominum, 
quod situm est in generis humani societate, tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque animi 
erudiuit, eademque ab animo tamquam ab oculis caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera, 
infera, prima, ultima, media uideremus. Prorsus haec diuina mihi uidetur uis, quae tot 
res efficiat et tantas. Quid est enim memoria rerum et uerborum? Quid porro inuentio? 
Profecto id, quo ne in deo quidem quicquam maius intellegi potest.26 
One must emphasise the semantic transposition of the syntagma uis diuina. 
While Cicero used the adjective diuinus to refer to everything that has the power 
to provoke change or alteration and vary, that is not humanus, Jacobo de Saá aims 
this qualificative directly at God.27 Thus, the Ciceronian text, Profecto id, quo ne in 
deo quidem quicquam maius intellegi potest, and De Saá’s own, respectively, Profecto 
id, inquit Cicero, quo nec in Deo quicquam maius intellegi potest. Thus, he is showing 
God’s supremacy in all aspects of the world. In the same way, the religiosity of the 
Portuguese author must be noted, as there are frequent allusions scattered through 
his work to the Deus Christianus with that value of the validity of his knowledge and 
disciplines such disciplines themselves, supported by the words of Cicero, excepting 
the anachronies in all cases. Also, at no time does Jacobo de Saa invoke the name of 
God directly to explain the phenomena, but it is used to provide validity and solidity 
to his text.
In a second approach, we find a well-known filosophical motto,
lucky, there is nothing in man so that he can do philosophy. Certainly, says Laertius, like me, there is a 
unique possession not only right, but also true. And not very distant from these questions, Cicero took 
knowledge and belief of the divine and human issues for which a cause is specific to each of these issues. 
He did not because of this bring the present when he said, “Where is Wisdom? and “what is the place for 
intelligence?” Man knows no appeal of this and is not in the land of those who live pleasantly” (Iacobus 
a Saa. De nauigatione, 2, f. 34r-35r).
26. “My personal opinion is that not even the most famous and illustrious arts are exempt from a 
divine power, so I cannot believe that a poet composes a solemn and courteous poem without either 
divine inspiration in his mind, or that the eloquence flows with an abundance of sonorous words and 
fruitful thoughts without the intervention of a higher power. As for philosophy, mother of all arts, what 
else is it but, as Plato says, a gift, or as I contend, a finding of the gods? She is the one who instructed 
us, first, in the worship of the gods, then, human right, which is based on the coexistence of mankind 
and, finally, in moderation and magnanimity, and has been she who has dispersed the fog of the soul, as 
if snatched from our eyes, so we can see all things: those above, those below, the first, middle and last 
ones. This force that produces so many important effects seems to me a divine truth. What in reality is 
the memory of the things and the words? What is also invective? Certainly not even in divinity can a 
faculty that exceeds it be conceivable” (Cicero. Tusculanae, 1, 26).
27. Bear in mind that even in Saá’s manuscript, the syntagma in Deo appears, in capital letters, as we 
have been able to see in the passage from Jacobo de Saá.
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Quae perspicuam omnibus ueritatem continet assumptio, nihil indiget approbationis. Ea 
est huiusmodi: “Si oportet uelle sapere, dare operam philosophiae conuenit”. Hic propositio 
indiget approbationis; non enim perspicua est neque constat inter omnes, propterea quod 
multi nihil prodesse philosophiam, plerique etiam obesse arbitrantur; assumptio perspicua 
est enim haec: “Oportet autem uelle sapere”. Hoc quia ipsum ex se perspicitur et uerum esse 
intellegitur, nihil attinet approbari. Quare statim concludenda est argumentatio. Est ergo 
assumptio quaedam, quae approbationis non indiget; nam quandam indigere perspicuum 
est. Separata est igitur ab adsumptione approbatio. Falsum ergo est non esse plus quam 
tripertitam argumentationem.28
Although the medieval text presents no apparent contradiction between Deus 
and Philosophia it leaves it Cicero’s maximum clear Si oportet uelle sapere, dare operam 
philosophiae conuenit which the second person adapts to be able to maintain the 
literary figure of the dialogue directed at mathematics. Philosophy, the discipline 
that is impressed on all thought and science, is necessary for the evolution of all 
disciplines, also for navigation. 
In the following passage, De Saá returns to the allusion to the earliest philosophers 
and thinkers, now giving direct references through Tusculanae by Cicero and with 
Aristoteles as the accuser. While the first text in this study he critised these with 
the phrase Antiquitus enim sine ordine procedebant, now he praised the wisdom that 
they showed, thus both questions not being incompatible. Following Aristotle, 
Cicero and De Saa Both both denounce the methods of the ancient thinkers, while 
proclaiming the importance of their discovery: Philosophy.
Diodorus in priuatione doloris summum bonum posuit. Peripatetici autem, in bonis animi et 
corporis et fortunae. Herilli summum bonum est scientia: Zenonis, cum natura congruenter 
uiuere. Aristoteles in honestate ac uirtute summum bonum collocauit. Et idem, ut inquit 
Cicero, uereteres Philosophos accusans, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriossisimos fuisse, qui 
existimassent suis ingeniis Philosophiam perfectam esse. Thales Milesius, qui unus e septem 
sapientum numero fuit, aquam esse dixit a qua omnia nata sunt: Deum autem mentem esse, 
qui ex aqua cuncta formauerit.29
28. “A minor premise containing a truism for everyone need not be demonstrated. One such argument 
is: “If one should aspire to wisdom, one should study philosophy”. This major premise requires 
demonstration, since neither is it clear to everyone and nor does everyone agree with it as many people 
consider philosophy useless and most even think it is harmful. The following minor premise, however, 
is clear: “It is desirable to become wise”. Since this statement is self-evident and true, there is no need to 
prove it. So, you can go straight to the conclusion of the argument. There are therefore minor premises 
that need no demonstration and it is equally clear that others do. The demonstration is ultimately a 
different element of the minor premise. So it is false that an argument has only three parts” (Cicero. De 
inventione, 1, 65).
29. “Diodorus placed the supreme good over the deprivation of pain, while the Peripatetics [placed it] 
over the goods not only of the mind and body, but also of fortune. The highest good of Herillus is science, 
that of Zeno is living in harmony with nature. Aristotle placed the supreme good between honesty and 
virtue. And even, as Cicero says, that it, by going against the ancient philosophers said that they were 
very wise and very glorious, who would have to consider that philosophy was achieved through their 
ideas. Thales of Miletus, who was unique among the amount of seven sages, said water is the element 
from which all things are born, then intelligence is God who has shaped everything from water” (Iacobus 
a Saa. De nauigatione, 2, f. 37r).
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And in Cicero,
Itaque Aristoteles ueteres philosophos accusans, qui existumauissent philosophiam suis 
ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed se uidere, quod 
paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, breui tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore.30
The use that Saá makes of God in this passage from the De nauigatione is again 
striking as, Thales Milesius, qui unus e septem sapientum numero fuit, aquam esse dixit a 
qua omnia nata sunt: Deum autem mentem esse, qui ex aqua cuncta formauerit. The fact 
that everything that is known has come ex aqua and thus everything is this aqua, 
there is no reason to be without God’s modelling. Thus, God is presented as “power 
of life”, but “not of material”.31 Under Jacobo de Saá’s perspective, this idea of the 
origin of the world by Tales de Mileto, appears incomplete, because, as he admitted 
in earlier texts, materia ac mens est Deus. This same idea that “everything is God”, 
and “God is everything”, is patent in the following text referring to the origin of 
God, contrasting Him with human life, so ephemerous and fragile. Thus, everything 
the human being can do is limited and prevenient, everything done by God is 
imperishable and comes from God Himself,
Sed non quaero ex quibus ista materiis tam magna tam mirifica opera Deus fecerit: omnia 
enim fecit ex nihilo. Nec audiendi sunt Poetae, qui in principio Chaos aiunt fuisse, id est, 
confusionem rerum atque elementorum: quia credunt nihil fieri posse nisi ex materia 
subiacente ac parata. In quo errore, etiam Philosophi fuerunt. Nam Cicero de natura 
Deorum hoc disputauit. Quibus facile est respondere, potestatem Dei non intelligentibus. 
Deus uero sibi ipse materiam facit, quia potest: posse enim Dei est. Nam si non potest, Deus 
non est. Homo facit ex eo quod est: quia per mortalitatem imbecillis est ac modicae potestatis. 
Deus autem facit ex eo quod non est: quia per aeternitatem fortis est.32
In order not to contradict the Christian doctrine contained in the Holy Scriptures 
Jacobo de Saá explains that the error by those Poets, referring to both the Presocratics 
30. “For this reason Aristotle, censoring the ancient philosophers, who had thought that through 
ingenuity, philosophy had reached perfection, says they are either of an extreme need or the height 
of vanity; however, since in few years great progress had been made, he saw that in a short time, 
philosophy would reach its perfection” (Cicero. Tusculanae, 3, 69).
31. This idea brings up a comparison with the classical myth of Prometheus, in which he is presented 
as carrying the power of human life, but always with a third person like Zeus intervening.
32. “But do not try to obtain what materials God has made this such excellent and wonderful creation. 
In truth, he created all from nothing. And the Poets, who maintain that at first there was Chaos, that is 
confusion of bodies and elements, have to be taken into account, as they believe that nothing can settle 
unless it is from existing and prepared matter. Even philosophers fell into this error. For, Cicero defended 
it about the nature of the gods. For them, it is easy to respond that the power of God is not among the 
understandable things. But God himself formed the material for himself because he has the ability. 
Indeed, the power to create is proper to God. If that were not possible, it therefore he would not be God. 
Man creates from what exists, because, given his mortality, he exists from a weak and modest power. 
God, on the other hand, creates from what does not exist, because, given his eternity, this remains solid” 
(Iacobus a Saa. De nauigatione, 2, f. 44r-45ª).
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and Neoterics33 was not to follow the moral precepts of Christian faith (although 
this arose later, in the Helenistic epoch), and to consider that in principio Chaos fuit 
seems to contradict the divine order with which Genesis narrates the birth of the 
world at God’s hand. To support his opinion against atheism and give validity to his 
discourse, he paraphrases passages from Cicero’s De natura deorum, 
Quid Diagoras, Atheos qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus nonne aperte deorum naturam 
sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cuius a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes 
temporibus illis uel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset “De diuis neque, ut sint 
neque ut non sint, habeo dicere”, Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus 
librique eius in contione combusti; ex quo equidem existimo tardioris ad hanc sententiam 
profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. 
Quid de sacrilegis, quid de impiis periurisque dicemus?34
Indeed, Cicero’s text accuses the atheists of his time, but not those of Jacobo De 
Saá’s medieval epoch, thus producing the phenomenon of the apology for ideas 
done anachronically. 
However, if we compare the fragment immediately above from Cicero with the 
following from De nauigatione, we will appreciate that De Saa criticized Cicero because 
the later regarded Protagoras as the greatest philosopher of his time, despite being 
an atheist: Quia autem non bene naturae secreta praeceptor ille Protagoras fuit rimatus, 
discipuli claudicauerunt: et sophistam illum Cicero appellauit temporibus illis máximum: 
Coarguit etiam aestimationem Philosophorum, qui ingeniis suis putassent erutam esse 
atque inuentam ueritatem. Quod Arcesilas ueritate non cognita facere conatus, introduxit 
Philosophiae genus asusatou, quod Latine instabile seu inconstans dicere possumus. Vt 
enim nihil scire posse, sciendum sit, aliquid sciri necesse est. Hinc Academiae disciplina 
manauit, si tamen disciplina dici potest, in qua ignoratio discitur et docetur. Quia autem 
non bene naturae secreta praeceptor ille Protagoras fuit rimatus, discipuli claudicauerunt: 
et sophistam illum Cicero appellauit temporibus illis maximum: quia fictam quandam 
sapientiae speciem iactitauit, et apparens et non existens fuit sophos. Nam si ille perfectus 
fuisset, perfectius docuisset. Quia, ut ait Philosophus, signum sapientis est, scire docere. Pace 
tamen tua dixerim hoc, quia cum tibi plusquam oportebat deditus fuit, caecutiuit.35
33. This regarding the first lines of Genesis: In principio creauit Deus caelum et terram terra autem erat inanis 
et uacua et tenebrae super faciem abyssi et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux 
(Gen., 1-3).
34. “What about Diagoras, who was called ‘the Atheist’, or later with Theodore? Did they not unequivocally 
eliminate the existence of any divine nature? Well, Protagoras of Abdera, meanwhile, —who you 
mentioned recently— perhaps the greatest sophist of those times, for putting at the beginning of his book 
that of the “about deities I cannot say that they exist, or that cease to exist”, was banished from the city 
and its region on orders from the Athenians, and his books were burned in public. I believe, indeed, that, 
because of that, many left professing that view for later, since not even a hesitant attitude could have 
escaped punishment. What shall we say about the sacrilege? What about the wicked and the perjurers?” 
(Cicero. Natura deorum, 1, 63).
35. “(Aristotle) also shows irrefutably the esteem of the philosophers who, through their ideas, have 
thought that the truth was invented and abstracted. Since Archelaus spent efforts in virtue of an unknown 
truth, he introduced the “asusatou” philosophical genre, which we can call hesitant or inconsistent in 
Latin language. Certainly, for nothing to have able to be known it is necessary for something to be 
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In a second approach, the Portuguese scholar refers to the concept of existence. For 
De Saá, the existential knowledge of the Ancients was mistaken. In fact, considering 
that what exists, exists through being in a physical form, and to contrast this with 
what does not exist, this idea, being obvious, does not enter into his Christian 
conception: God exists, thus, in an abstract form, but not physically. The contrastive 
dichotomy, according to the ancient philosophers, must be linked to knowledge of 
the truth. Thus, if one starts from the fact that “something” that is known is also 
assumed a priori to exist, and together with this, this knowledge has intrinsically 
to be true, in other words, obvious. De Saá bases such an idea on Cicero’s criticism 
in the De natura deorum of the contradictions of each of the philosophers. He also 
introduces a new type of philosophical quality, asísatou, that derives from those 
Greek thinkers, that he qualifies as instabile and inconstans given their erroneous 
conclusions. The inexistence of a universal tryth arises from the next two passages, 
an aspect that De Saá has been insisting on faced with the contradictions that arose 
in his epoch, with Christianity in an advanced stage of development, given that the 
Christian principles clashed head-on with those of those primitive philosophers, 
Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, his quattuor Academicis 
libris satis responsum uidetur. Nec uero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium 
suscepimus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris 
fortasse desiderant. Vt haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem 
aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad 
nostram uiguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. Quod 
non Academiae uitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas 
percipere magnum est, quanto maius omnis; quod facere is necesse est, quibus propositum 
est ueri reperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Cuius rei tantae 
tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero. Nec 
tamen fieri potest, ut, qui hac ratione philosophentur, hi nihil habeant, quod sequantur. 
Dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed quia nimis indociles quidam tardique 
sunt, admonendi uidentur saepius. Non enim sumus i, quibus nihil uerum esse uideatur, 
sed i, qui omnibus ueris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine, ut in is 
nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. Ex quo exsistit et illud multa esse probabilia, 
quae, quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia uisum quendam haberent insignem et 
inlustrem, his sapientis uita regeretur.36 
known. You need to know that something so as to know what cannot be known. Here started the 
doctrine of the Academy, although it can be termed a discipline in which ignorance is learned as much 
as taught. Since that preceptor, Protagoras, incorrectly considered the mysteries of nature, his disciples 
did not follow him. To that sophist who Cicero described as the greatest of the past. As he began to recite 
some kind of feigned wisdom, he was even wise appearing to be so, but not being so. For if that had been 
correct, he would have taught properly, because, as the Philosopher says, there is a motto for the wise: 
“learn to learn”. However, it could be said for your peace of mind that you could not give conclusions 
clearly, however much it suited you, when it was offered to you” (Iacobus a Saa. De nauigatione, 2, f. 
46a-46r).
36. “Moreover, those who admire that we have preferred to follow the method of this school have been 
answered sufficiently, it seems to us, in the four academic Books. It is not true that we have assumed 
the guardianship of some abandoned and neglected issues because, when people die, opinions do not 
also succumb, but rather, these can lack the brilliance of an authority. This is true in philosophy, with 
this procedure, which consists of being able to lecture against all and not judge on any matter without 
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Or, we can pick up this idea clearly set out in the following passage from the same 
work by Cicero,
Totum hoc “aut etiam aut non” negauit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtusius? 
Vrguebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quae sensibus uiderentur, Zenon 
autem non nulla uisa esse falsa, non omnia; timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum uisum esset 
falsum, nullum esset uerum: omnes sensus ueri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nisi ualde 
inconsiderate; grauiorem enim plagam accipiebat, ut leuiorem repelleret.37 
Indeed, the idea presented previously is covered in the Ciceronian phrase 
from this latter passage: Totum hoc “aut etiam aut non” negauit esse necessarium. The 
inexistence of a ueritas absoluta has been, and is, an aspect of philosophy, logic, any 
other sciences and disciplines, and the human being itslef, that it is still opening new 
paths for study and for thought. 
3. Conclusions
The Middle Ages appeared as a decadent and dark epoch. Coming between Classic 
Antiquity and the Renaissance was the main reason for this perception, given that 
they fell between two epochs of classical splendour. Christian faith dominated all 
aspects of medieval life. Science, education and other disciplines could not progress 
without being bound to religion. 
In the field of navigation, this period is presented as one of innovation, with 
precise advances through influences from other parts of the world. Among other 
disciplines, mathematics, astronomy, arithmetic, philosophy and logic led to progress 
in navigation as a whole, generating mathematical-philosophical laws supported 
and studied through observation of the heavens. This way, the previous rudimentary 
methods and techniques of orientation, inherited from old Roman navigation, 
became obsolete. New high-seas routes were opened that allowed sailors to pass 
areas until then out of bounds for sailing. All these advances began to be compiled 
in tractatus that attempted to describe the new and developed nautical world. 
reservation: after being taken up by Socrates, retaken by Arcesilaus and consolidated by Carneades, it has 
remained valid until our time. I know that this procedure is now almost orphaned in Greece itself, which, 
as I believe, has not happened due to an imperfection of the Academy, but to the stupidity of people. 
As, if it were great to understand each school separately, how much greater will it be to understand 
them! Necessarily they have to do what, in order to find the truth, has been proposed to talk, sometimes 
against, and others in favour, of each and every one of the philosophers” (Cicero. Natura deorum, 1, 11).
37. “He said it was not necessary all that of ‘yes or no’... Could anything more obtuse have been 
said? Arcesilaus pestering Zeno saying everything he saw through the senses was false, while Zeno, 
meanwhile, said that some visions were false, but not all. Epicurus feared that if a single vision turned 
out to be missing, none were: he said that all the senses were emissaries of truth. Had he acted with 
absolute thoughtlessness, he had not said anything, because, to repel a slight wound, he received one 
even more serious” (Cicero. Natura deorum, 1, 70).
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The importance of philosophy in navigation was such that one of these extensive 
treatises, the De nauigatione libri tres quibus Mathematicae disciplinae explicantur by 
Jacobo de Saá, included it as an element essential for developing one’s knowledge. 
Written in the form of a dialogue between two actors, the mathematical and 
philosophical disciplines, the author tried to give logical and coherent vision of 
the navigation systems through abstract statements, questions and negations, but, 
obviously, with practical means in mind.
To support his ideas, De Saá often resorted to citing and recalling classical authors 
from the Roman epoch, such as Cicero. Given that this orator represented Roman 
philosophy antonomastically, he went on to make constant references to his works 
and to copy almost literally his most representative and profound phrases for the 
evolution of the philosophy, emphasising in this regard that uis diuina that had 
the power to promote movements and natural forces in their relation with the 
movements of the stars. Jacobo de Saá, a Christian author, also had no doubts in 
quoting Cicero reiteratedly throughout his work to sustain his principles, not only 
the religious, but also the philosophical ones; although, anachronicaly, these did not 
converge with those of the orator. 
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